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Abstract
Political elites sometimes seek to delegitimize election results using unsubstantiated claims of
fraud. Most recently, Donald Trump sought to overturn his loss in the 2020 US presidential
election by falsely alleging widespread fraud. Our study provides new evidence demonstrat-
ing the corrosive effect of fraud claims like these on trust in the election system. Using a
nationwide survey experiment conducted after the 2018 midterm elections – a time when
many prominent Republicans also made unsubstantiated fraud claims – we show that expo-
sure to claims of voter fraud reduces confidence in electoral integrity, though not support for
democracy itself. The effects are concentrated among Republicans and Trump approvers.
Worryingly, corrective messages from mainstream sources do not measurably reduce the
damage these accusations inflict. These results suggest that unsubstantiated voter-fraud
claims undermine confidence in elections, particularly when the claims are politically con-
genial, and that their effects cannot easily be mitigated by fact-checking.
Keywords: Misinformation; voter fraud; social media
After Donald Trump lost the 2020 US presidential election, he and his allies made
sweeping and unsupported claims that the election had been stolen. These unsub-
stantiated assertions ranged from familiar voter-fraud tropes (claims that illegiti-
mate ballots were submitted by dead people) to the fanciful (voting machines
were part of a complicated conspiracy involving the late Venezuelan leader
Hugo Chávez). Amid increasingly heated rhetoric, a January 6, 2021 “Stop the
Steal” rally was followed by a violent insurrection at the US Capitol that sought
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to disrupt the certification of President-elect Biden’s victory, a tragic event many
observers partially attributed to the false claims of fraud made by President
Trump and his allies.
Claims of voter fraud like this are not uncommon, especially outside the USA. In
early February 2021, the Myanmar military justified its coup against the civilian
government by alleging voter fraud in the most recent election (Goodman 2021).
In other cases, elites have made unsubstantiated claims of voter fraud in order
to cast doubt on unfavorable or potentially damaging electoral results. For instance,
Jair Bolsonaro, the president of Brazil, expressed fears of voter fraud during his pres-
idential campaign in 2018 to pre-emptively cast doubt on an unfavorable electoral
outcome (Savarese 2018). Prabowo Subianto, a presidential candidate who lost the
2019 Indonesian election, used this tactic even more aggressively, claiming that he
had been the victim of voter fraud and refusing to concede (Paddock 2019).
Though accusations of misconduct are a frequent feature of electoral politics, the
effects of this phenomenon on voter beliefs and attitudes have not been extensively
studied. To date, research has largely focused on how actual irregularities or the pres-
ence of institutions intended to constrain malfeasance affect electoral confidence,
particularly in less established democracies (e.g., Norris 2014; Hyde 2011). Less is
known about the effects of unfounded assertions of voter fraud on public faith in free
and fair elections, especially in advanced democracies such as the USA. Can elites
delegitimize a democratic outcome by asserting that electoral irregularities took place?
Our motivating examples, particularly recent events in the USA, suggest reasons for
concern. Given the centrality of voter fraud to Trump’s rhetoric in the weeks leading
up the January 6 insurrection, it is essential to better understand whether and how
baseless accusations of election-related illegalities affect citizens.1
While recent events and the voluminous elite cues literature (e.g., Zaller 1992)
lead us to expect that fraud claims would have a deleterious effect, several streams
of previous research suggest that political leaders may have a limited ability to alter
citizen’s attitudes about the legitimacy of foundational political institutions like elec-
tions by inventing accusations of fraud. First, previous work in this area suggests
that unsubstantiated claims of widespread voter fraud may have little effect on pub-
lic attitudes. Most notably, recent studies of the 2016 US presidential election using
panel designs provide mixed evidence on the effect of voter-fraud claims. Despite
Donald Trump’s frequent (and unsubstantiated) claims of voter fraud before that
election, Trump voters’ confidence in elections did not measurably change and
Democrats’ confidence in elections actually increased pre-election, possibly in
response to Trump’s claims (Sinclair, Smith and Tucker 2018). After the election,
confidence in elections actually increased and belief in illicit voting decreased among
Trump supporters (a classic “winner effect”) while confidence of Clinton’s voters
remained unchanged (Levy 2020).
Second, there is a reason to be skeptical about claims that political leaders can
alter citizens’ attitudes so easily by alleging fraud. Studies find, for instance, that
1We use data collected in the aftermath of the 2018 US midterm election to examine how exposure to
Republican claims of voter in fraud affect confidence in election and support for democracy. An advantage
of this design is that while such claims were made, they were far less common than in 2020, allowing us to
better isolate the effect of exposure.
2 N. Berlinski et al.
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presidents struggle to change public opinion on most topics despite extensive efforts
to do so (Edwards 2006; Franco, Grimmer and Lim n.d.). Moreover, they may face
electoral sanctions for challenging democratic norms. Reeves and Rogowski (2016,
2018), for instance, argue that leaders are punished for acquiring or exercising
power in norm-violating ways. Similarly, conjoint studies by Carey et al. (2020)
and Graham and Svolik (2020) show that voters punish candidates for democratic
norm violations, though the magnitude of these punishments are modest and voters
may be more willing to apply them to the opposition party.
Finally, even psychological factors and message effects that make people vul-
nerable to claims of fraud such as directionally motivated reasoning, framing,
and elite cues face boundary conditions (Cotter, Lodge and Vidigal 2020;
Druckman 2001; Nicholson 2011). For instance, fact-checking may help promote
accurate beliefs and reduce the scope of misinformation effects (Nyhan and Reifler
2017; Wood and Porter 2019), though the effect of corrections on broader atti-
tudes and behavioral intentions is less clear (Nyhan et al. 2019, 2014). In addition,
respondents may distrust the sources of these claims and in turn discount the
messages they offer.
In short, while politicians undoubtedly make unfounded claims of voter fraud,
available evidence is less clear about whether such claims affect citizens’ faith in
elections. Our study addresses the limitations of prior panel studies and provides
direct experimental evidence of the effects of unfounded accusations of voter fraud
on citizens’ confidence in elections. This approach is most closely related to that of
Albertson and Guiler (2020), who show that telling respondents that “experts”
believe that the 2016 election was vulnerable to manipulation and fraud increased
perceptions of fraud, lowered confidence in the electoral system, and reduced will-
ingness to accept the outcome. However, our study differs in that the accusations we
test come from political leaders, a more common source in practice (experts believe
voter fraud is exceptionally rare in the USA).
We specifically evaluate the effects of exposure to voter-fraud claims from pol-
iticians in the context of the aftermath of the 2018 US midterm elections. Notably,
we not only test the effects of such accusations in isolation, but also examine the
effects of such exposure when fraud claims are paired with fact-checks from inde-
pendent experts. This design approach is critical for evaluating potential real-world
responses by, for example, social media companies that seek to mitigate harm from
voter-fraud claims (Klar 2020).
Our results show that exposure to unsubstantiated claims of voter fraud from
prominent Republicans reduces confidence in elections, especially among
Republicans and individuals who approve of Donald Trump’s performance in office.
Worryingly, exposure to fact-checks that show these claims to be unfounded does
not measurably reduce the damage from these accusations. The results suggest that
unsubstantiated claims of voter fraud undermine the public’s confidence in elec-
tions, particularly when the claims are politically congenial, and that these effects
cannot easily be ameliorated by fact-checks or counter-messaging. However, we find
no evidence that exposure to these claims reduces support for democracy itself.
From this perspective, unfounded claims of voter fraud represent a dangerous
attack on the legitimacy of democratic processes. Even when based on no evidence
and countered by non-partisan experts, such claims can significantly diminish the
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legitimacy of election outcomes among allied partisans. As the Capitol insurrection
suggests, diminished respect for electoral outcomes presents real dangers for democ-
racy (e.g., Minnite 2010). If electoral results are not respected, democracies cannot
function (Anderson et al. 2005). And even if losers step down, belief in widespread
voter fraud threatens to undermine public trust in elections, delegitimize election
results, and promote violence or other forms of unrest.
Experimental design
We conducted our experiment among 4,283 respondents in the USA who were sur-
veyed online in December 2018/January 2019 by YouGov (see Online Appendix A
for details on the demographic characteristics of the sample, response rate, and
question wording).2 This research was approved by the institutional review boards
of the University of Exeter, the University of Michigan, Princeton University, and
Washington University in St. Louis. After a pre-treatment survey, respondents were
randomly assigned to view either a series of non-political tweets (placebo); four
tweets alleging voter fraud (low dose); the four tweets alleging voter fraud from
the low-dose condition plus four additional tweets alleging voter fraud (high dose);
or the four tweets from the low-dose condition alleging voter fraud plus four fact-
check tweets (low dose  fact-check). Respondents then completed post-treatment
survey questions measuring our outcome. Respondents were unaware of treatment
condition. There was no missing data for our primary outcome, and minimal miss-
ing data for secondary outcomes (between 0.0% and 0.9%). A summary of missing
data for outcome measures and moderators can be found in Table A3.
Immediately after the election, several prominent Republicans, including Florida
Governor Rick Scott, Senators Lindsey Graham and Marco Rubio, and Trump him-
self, made unfounded allegations of voter fraud while counts were still ongoing
(Lopez 2018). Tweets from these political elites and fact-checks of the claims were
used as the treatment stimuli (see Figure 1 for an example). This design has high
external validity, allowing us to show actual claims of voter fraud made by party
elites to respondents in the original format in which they were seen by voters.
To match this format’s external validity, we draw on actual corrections produced
by the Associated Press, PBS NewsHour, and NYT Politics, again in the form of
tweets (see Online Appendix A). Though these messages do not come from dedi-
cated fact-checking outlets per se, these standalone articles fit within the larger dif-
fusion of the format through the mainstream press (Graves, Nyhan and Reifler
2015) and follow prior work on journalistic corrections (Nyhan et al. 2019;
Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Pingree et al. 2018).
Hypotheses and research questions
We expect that exposure to unfounded voter-fraud claims reduces confidence in
elections (e.g., Alvarez, Hall and Llewellyn 2008; Hall, Quin Monson and
Patterson 2009), the immediate object of criticism, and potentially undermines
2This survey also included orthogonal studies reported in Guess et al. (2020).
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support for democracy itself (Inglehart 2003). This expectation leads to four prereg-
istered hypotheses and two research questions.3
Our first three preregistered hypotheses concern the effect of exposure to voter-
fraud allegations. We expect that low (H1a) and high (H2a) doses of exposure to
allegations of voter fraud will reduce confidence in elections and that a high dose
will have a stronger effect (H3a). The idea that increased message dosage should lead
to greater effects is long-standing and intuitive (Arendt 2015; Cacioppo and Petty
1979) and has received some empirical support (e.g., Ratcliff et al. 2019), but evi-
dence is limited for this claim in the domain of politics (Arendt, Marquart and
Matthes 2015; Baden and Lecheler 2012; Lecheler and de Vreese 2013; Miller
and Krosnick 1996). Higher doses may have diminishing returns in political mes-
saging, with large initial effects among people who have not previously been exposed
to similar messages but less additional influence as exposure increases (Markovich
et al. 2020).
We also expect the effects of exposure to be greater when the claims are politically
congenial (H1b–H3b) given the way pre-existing attitudes affect the processing of
new information (e.g., Kunda 1990; Taber and Lodge 2006), including on election/
voter fraud (Edelson et al. 2017; Udani, Kimball and Fogarty 2018).
Fact-checks can be effective in counteracting exposure to misinformation (Chan
et al. 2017; Fridkin, Kenney and Wintersieck 2015). Our fourth hypothesis therefore
predicts that fact-checks can reduce the effects of exposure to a low dose of voter-
fraud misinformation on perceived electoral integrity (H4a). We also expect fact-
checks will reduce the effects of voter-fraud misinformation more for audiences
for whom the fraud messages are politically congenial simply because the initial
effects are expected to be larger (H4b).
Finally, we also consider preregistered research questions. First, we ask whether
exposure to both a low dose of allegations of voter fraud and fact-checks affects
confidence in elections compared to the placebo condition baseline per Thorson
Figure 1.
Example stimulus tweet from the experiment.
3We provide a “populated pre-analysis plan” (Duflo et al. 2020) and a link to the preregistration in Online
Appendix E (the relevant preregistered hypotheses and analysis plan for this study appear in Section E). It is
important to clarify that the preregistration is time-stamped February 20, 2019 even though data were col-
lected in December 2018/January 2019. However, it was filed prior to data delivery from YouGov, which was
withheld until February 27, 2019 – after the preregistration was filed. (The letter documenting the delivery
date is provided here: https://osf.io/9y8db/.)
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(2016) (RQ1a). Second, we test whether this result differs when the claims are
politically congenial (RQ1b).4 Finally, we examine whether these effects extend
beyond attitudes toward electoral institutions and affect support for democracy
itself (RQ2).5
Methods
To test our main hypotheses, we examine seven survey items that tap into different
aspects of election integrity (e.g., “How confident are you that election officials man-
aged the counting of ballots fairly in the election this November?”). Descriptive sta-
tistics for all items are shown in Table 1 and complete question wording is shown in
Online Appendix A. On average, respondents indicated modestly high levels of con-
fidence in US electoral institutions and election integrity.
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) showed that these items scaled together; we
therefore created a standardized outcome measure of confidence in the electoral sys-
tem. All seven items loaded onto a single factor; the absolute value of the factor
loadings was greater than 0.6 for all cases and typically larger than 0.8. To identify
the latent space, we set the variance of the latent factor to one, allowing all treatment
effects to be interpreted as sample standard deviations (SDs). A full discussion of
this process is presented in Online Appendix B.6
We estimate linear regression models that include only main effects for experi-
mental conditions as well as models that interact treatment indicators with meas-
ures for whether voter-fraud misinformation was congenial for respondents. In our
original preregistration, we stated we would test the hypotheses related to congenial-
ity by including an interaction term with an indicator for whether or not a respon-
dent is a Republican, which implicitly combines Democrats and independents into a
single category. We found that Democrats and independents actually responded
quite differently to the treatments and therefore deviate from our preregistration
to estimate results separately using all three categories below (the preregistered
4These RQs compare the low-dose  fact-check condition to the placebo condition while H4a and H4b
compare the low-dose condition to the low-dose  fact-check condition.
5These RQs deviate from our preregistration by splitting confidence in elections and support for democ-
racy into separate outcome variables. Originally, we preregistered that H1–H4 and RQ1 would apply to
“confidence in elections and (emphasis added) support for democracy.” However, this statement was based
on a preregistered factor analysis of the individual items reported in Online Appendix B. As the factor anal-
ysis distinguished between these items, we include both (as per our preregistration) but examine them sep-
arately. Adding an RQ is meant to aid the reader’s understanding of which analyses apply to which outcome
variable. See also Footnote 1.
6As noted in Appendix B, our preregistered approach was to include seven items measuring election
confidence and five additional items measuring support for democracy. We noted that if these separate
batteries “represent a single construct” we would combine them into a single composite measure. Our pre-
registration did not specify what would be done if the items did not scale onto a single dimension. As shown
in the appendix, EFA indicated that the seven election confidence items did relate to a single underlying
construct. Our main analysis therefore focuses on this measure. However, the five remaining items scaled
onto two separate dimensions. For the sake of completeness, we therefore analyze both those five individual
items and the two composite measures that correspond to the indicated dimensions in Online Appendix C
(Tables C4–C7). This approach represents a deviation from our preregistration in that we did not specify
how we would proceed under these circumstances.
6 N. Berlinski et al.
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analysis is provided in Table C3 in the Online Appendix). In addition, we also con-
ducted exploratory analyses using approval of President Trump as an alternative
moderator of whether the fraud messages were congenial.
Finally, for RQ2, we relied on a separate five-item battery measuring commit-
ment to democratic governance reported in Online Appendix A. We analyze both
the individual items and two composite scales suggested by our EFA (see
Footnote 1).
Deviations from preregistered analysis plan
For transparency, we provide a summary of the deviations from our preregistration
here. First, per above, we now examine potential congeniality effects for
Republicans, Democrats, and independents separately rather than examining differ-
ences between Republicans and all others. Online Appendix C contains the prereg-
istered specification in which Democrats and independents are analyzed together.
Second, we present an additional, exploratory test of congeniality using Trump
approval as a moderator. Third, we present main effects below for individual items
from our outcome measure of election confidence in addition to the composite mea-
sure; our preregistration stated that we would report results separately for each
dependent variable included in the composite measure in the Online Appendix,
but we have included these models in the main text. Fourth, RQ2 deviates from
our preregistration in that effects on both election confidence and support for
democracy were included as outcomes of interest for H1–H4 and RQ1 pending
a preregistered factor analysis of the individual items. As this factor analysis distin-
guished between these outcomes (see Online Appendix B), we conduct separate
analyses for support for democracy. These results are discussed briefly below,
but are reported in full in Online Appendix C. A complete discussion of our pre-
registered analyses as well as deviations are shown in Online Appendix E.
Table 1.
Measures of Confidence in Elections
Question Mean SD Range
Confidence all entitled allowed to vote 2.58 1.00 [1, 4]
Confidence own vote was counted† 3.18 0.88 [1, 4]
Confidence officials manage counting votes 2.57 0.92 [1, 4]
System works despite problems casting and counting votes 2.75 0.89 [1, 4]
Trust elections 4.60 1.63 [1, 7]
Ballots secure from tampering 2.86 1.02 [1, 4]
Voting machines accurate 3.42 0.96 [1, 5]
Composite measure§ 0 1 [−2.52, 1.99]
Notes: Complete question wordings for all items are provided in Online Appendix A.
†Indicates that the item was only asked of respondents who indicated they voted.
§Indicates a composite measure of election confidence that was created using confirmatory factor analysis (see Online
Appendix B for estimation details).
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Results
We focus our presentation below on estimated treatment effects for our composite
measure of election confidence. However, we present treatment effects for each
component outcome measure (exploratory) as well as the composite measure of
election confidence (preregistered) in Table 2. Figure 2 shows the effects for the
composite measure. Since the composite measure is standardized, the effects can
be directly interpreted in terms of SDs.
We find that exposure to the low-dose condition significantly reduced confidence
in elections compared to the placebo condition (H1a: β=−0.147 SD, p< 0.005).
This pattern also held in the high-dose condition (H2a: β= −0.168 SD,
p< 0.005).7 However, we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no difference in effects
(H3a); the effects of exposure to low versus high doses of tweets alleging voter fraud
are not measurably different. This result, which we calculate as the difference in
treatment effects between the low-dose and high-dose conditions, is reported in
the row in Table 1 labeled “Effect of higher dosage.”8
A crucial question in this study is whether the effect of fact-check tweets can
offset the effect of the tweets alleging fraud. We find that exposure to fact-checks
after a low dose of unfounded voter-fraud claims did not measurably increase elec-
tion confidence relative to the low-dose condition. As a result, the negative effects of
exposure remain relative to the placebo condition.
Specifically, we can reject the null hypothesis of no difference in election confidence
between participants exposed to the low dose  fact-check tweets versus those in the
placebo condition (RQ1a: β=−0.092. SD, p< 0.05). This effect is negative, indicating
the fact-check tweets do not eliminate the harmful effects of exposure to unfounded
allegations of fraud on election confidence. Substantively, the effect estimate is smaller
than the effect for the low-dose condition with no fact-check tweets described
above (H1a: β=−0.147 SD, p< 0.005) but the difference is not reliably distinguish-
able from zero (H4a: βlow dose  fact-check− βlow dose= −0.055 SD, p> 0.05).
Next, we examined the effect of voter-fraud messages on respondents for whom
the content of those messages (and the sources who endorse them) would be con-
genial – the Republican identifiers and leaners whose party was seen as losing the
2018 midterm elections. We estimate how our treatment effects vary by party and by
approval of President Trump in Tables C1 and C2 in Online Appendix C. The
resulting marginal effect estimates are presented in Figure 3.9
7We did not conduct any power analyses in advance. However, Online Appendix F uses the DeclareDesign
approach to approximate the power of our design and provide context for interpreting these results (Blair
et al. 2019). These simulations show that we are well powered to detect main effects of approximately or larger,
which is consistentwithourestimates forH1aandH2a.However, the low-dose corrections condition (RQ1a) falls
below this threshold. In addition, despite our large sample, we are powered to detect only fairly large interaction
terms (larger than approximately 0.25). The design is sufficiently powered to detect an estimand similar inmagni-
tude to the estimatewe report for the high-doseDemocrat interaction inTable C1.However, we are not powered to
detect interactions if the true estimand is as small as the estimate for the low-dose Democrat interaction.
8Effects for individual outcome measures are generally but not uniformly consistent with these patterns.
Most notably, none of the treatments had an effect on beliefs that ballots are secure from tampering, a claim
that was not questioned in the stimuli shown to respondents.
9Our analysis of effects by party deviates from our preregistered analysis by examining Democrats and
independents separately. We discuss this in greater detail in Online Appendix C, which also contains the
8 N. Berlinski et al.
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We first analyze the results based on party identification. We find that the effects
of exposure to a high dose of voter-fraud misinformation vary significantly by party
(H2b; p< 0.01), decreasing voter confidence significantly only among Republicans.
By contrast, the effect of the low dosage of four tweets of voter-fraud misinforma-
tion is not measurably different between Democrats and Republicans (H1b), though
the message’s marginal effect is significant for Republicans (p< 0.01) and not for
Democrats. Similarly, the effect of greater dosage of fraud allegations (i.e., high ver-
sus low dosage) does not vary measurably by party (H3b).
Results are similar when we consider attitudes toward President Trump as a
moderator. The effects of exposure to tweets varies significantly by approval in
the high-dose condition (p< 0.005), significantly reducing election confidence only
among respondents who approve of Trump. The interaction is not significant for
the low-dose condition, though again the effect of the treatment is only significant
among Trump approvers. Further, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the
additional effect of exposure to fact-check tweets (versus just the low dose of fraud
tweets) varied by Trump approval. However, the dosage effect (low versus high dos-
age) varied significantly by approval (β=−0.191 SD, p< 0.05). Among disap-
provers, additional dosage had no significant effect, but it reduced election
confidence significantly among approvers (β= −0.128 SD, p< 0.05).
The size of the effects reported in Figure 3 are worth emphasizing. The high-dose
condition, which exposed respondents to just eight tweets, reduced confidence in
the electoral system by 0.27 SDs among Republicans and 0.34 SDs among
Trump approvers. Even if these treatment effects diminish over time, these results
indicate that a sustained diet of exposure to such unfounded accusations could sub-
stantially reduce faith in the electoral system.
We also consider whether the effects of fact-check exposure vary between Democrats
and Republicans. We find the marginal effect of exposure to fact-checks (comparing the
low-dose  fact-check condition to the low-dose condition) does not vary significantly
by party (H4b). As a result, the negative effects of the low-dose condition on trust and
confidence in elections among Republicans (β= −0.184 SD, p< 0.01) persist if they are
also exposed to fact-checks in the low-dose  fact-check condition (β=−0.176 SD,
p< 0.05). This pattern replicates when we instead disaggregate by Trump support.
We find no measurable difference in the effects of the fact-checks by Trump approval,
but the low dose  fact-check reduces election confidence among Trump supporters
(β=−0.190 SD, p< 0.005) despite the presence of corrective information, mirroring
the effect in the low-dose condition (β=−0.211 SD, p< 0.005).10
Finally, we explore whether these treatments affect broader attitudes toward
democracy itself. Table C4 in Online Appendix C shows that the effects of the
low and high dosage voter-fraud treatments were overwhelmingly null on
preregistered specification in which they are analyzed together. In addition, our analysis of effect by Trump
approval is exploratory.
10As preregistered, we include additional analyses of other possible moderators of the effects of voter-
fraud message exposure in Online Appendix D (see Tables D3–D9). These moderators include trust in
and feelings toward the media, feelings toward Trump, conspiracy predispositions, political interest and
knowledge, and pre-treatment visits to fake news sites and fact-checking sites. We find little evidence of
additional heterogeneity, suggesting that the primary moderator is partisanship. A fully populated prereg-
istration is reported in Online Appendix E (Duflo et al. 2020).
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Table 2.

















Low dose (H1a) −0.209*** −0.120*** −0.150*** −0.138*** −0.155* −0.081 −0.038 −0.147***
(0.043) (0.042) (0.039) (0.038) (0.069) (0.044) (0.040) (0.042)
High dose (H2a) −0.195*** −0.137*** −0.146*** −0.172*** −0.173* −0.080 −0.095* −0.168***
(0.044) (0.043) (0.040) (0.038) (0.070) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043)
Low dose  fact-check
tweets (RQ1a)
−0.088* −0.122** −0.059 −0.095* −0.074 −0.062 −0.057 −0.092*
(0.043) (0.044) (0.040) (0.038) (0.070) (0.045) (0.042) (0.043)
Constant 2.706*** 3.274*** 2.656*** 2.848*** 4.704*** 2.913*** 3.469*** 0.102***
(0.031) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026) (0.048) (0.031) (0.029) (0.030)
Effect of higher dosage (H3a)
High dose − low dose 0.015 −0.017 0.004 −0.038 −0.018 0.001 −0.057 −0.021
(0.043) (0.043) (0.040) (0.039) (0.071) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043)
Effect of fact-check exposure (H4a)
(Low dose  fact-check)
− low dose
0.121*** −0.001 0.090* 0.043 0.081 0.018 −0.200 0.055
(0.043) (0.044) (0.040) (0.038) (0.071) (0.044) (0.041) (0.043)
N 4278 3283 4279 4279 4277 4273 4250 4283
Notes: *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.005 (two-sided). Ordinary least-squares regression models with robust standard errors. The outcome variable is a composite measure of election confidence
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“Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with Congress and elections,”
“Having experts, not government, make decisions,” “Having the army rule,”
“Having a democratic political system,” and the perceived importance of living
in a country that is governed democratically.11 These null effects were mirrored
Figure 2.
Marginal effect of exposure to claims of voter fraud on confidence in elections.
Notes: Difference in means (with 95% CIs) for composite measure of election confidence relative to the placebo
condition.
Figure 3.
Effect of exposure to claims of voter fraud on election confidence by predispositions.
Notes: Figure 3(a) shows the marginal effect by party of exposure to claims of voter fraud on composite measure of
election confidence relative to the placebo condition (Table C1), while Figure 3(b) shows the marginal effect by
Trump approval (Table C2). All marginal effect estimates include 95% CIs.
11We find reduced support at the level for a composite measure of support for alternatives to democracy
among respondents exposed to four tweets claiming voter fraud and four fact-check tweets. All results in
Table C4 are otherwise null. To assess the precision of these estimates, we estimate results from two
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in analyses of heterogeneous treatment effects by party and Trump approval in
Online Appendix C.
Conclusion
This study presents novel experimental evidence of the effect of unsubstantiated
claims of voter fraud on public confidence in elections. Using a large, nationally
representative sample collected after the 2018 US elections, we show that respond-
ents exposed to either low or high doses of voter-fraud claims reported less confi-
dence in elections than those in a placebo condition, though there was no evidence
that the treatments affected attitudes toward democracy more generally. These
effects varied somewhat by party. Exposure significantly reduced confidence in elec-
tions only among Republicans and Trump supporters, though these effects only dif-
fered measurably by party or Trump approval in the high-dosage condition.
Worryingly, we found little evidence that fact-check tweets measurably reduced
the effects of exposure to unfounded voter-fraud allegations. Adding corrections to
the low-dose condition did not measurably reduce the effects of exposure. As a
result, both Republicans and Trump approvers reported significantly lower confi-
dence in elections after exposure to a low dose of voter-fraud allegations even when
those claims were countered by fact-checks (compared to those in a placebo condi-
tion). These findings reinforce previous research on the potential lasting effects of
exposure to misinformation even after it is discredited (e.g., Thorson 2016). Our
findings also contribute to the growing understanding of the seemingly powerful
role of elites in promoting misinformation (Weeks and Gil de Zúñiga 2019) and
other potentially damaging outcomes such as conspiracy beliefs (Enders and
Smallpage 2019) and affective polarization (Iyengar et al. 2019).
Future work could address a number of limitations in our study and build on our
findings in several important ways. First, our treatment and dosage designs were
solely based on social media posts. Additional research could explore whether media
reports or editorials echoing accusations from political elites have greater effects
(e.g., Coppock et al. 2018). Second, journalistic corrections could likewise be
strengthened. Corrections from in-group media may be more influential; in the
present case, dismissal of fraud claims by outlets like The Weekly Standard or
The Daily Caller could be more credible among Republican respondents.
Similarly, dismissals from prominent Republican officials themselves might be more
influential as they signal intra-party disagreement (Lyons 2018) – a costly signal,
particularly for those who have shifted positions on the issue (Baum and
Groeling 2009; Benegal and Scruggs 2018; Lyons et al. 2019). However, such mes-
sengers may alternatively be subject to negative evaluation by way of a “black sheep
effect” (Matthews and Dietz-Uhler 1998) and could be less effective for Republicans
in particular (Agadjanian 2020). Third, our study examines messages that were con-
genial for Republicans. Though we sought to test the effects of fraud claims from the
one-sided equivalence tests at the 95% level. Across the outcome measures for which we obtain null results
(all of which are measured on a 1–4 scale), we can confidently rule out effects of 0.09 or smaller for the low-
dose condition (0.11 SD), 0.11 or smaller for the high-dose condition (0.11 SD), and 0.16 or smaller for the
low-dose  fact-check condition (0.20 SD).
12 N. Berlinski et al.
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sources who have most frequently made them, a future study should also test the
congeniality hypotheses we develop using Democrats as well.
While our data focuses on the US case, we strongly encourage future work to
examine both the prevalence of electoral fraud claims and the effects of such claims
comparatively. We suspect that there is important cross-national variation in how
frequently illegitimate electoral fraud claims are made. While we would expect our
central finding – exposure to elite messages alleging voter fraud undermines confi-
dence in elections – would be replicated in other locales, there may be important
nuance or scope conditions that additional cases would help reveal. For instance,
variation in electoral rules and candidates’ resulting relative dependence on the
media to communicate with voters may shape the nature of fraud claims themselves
(Amsalem et al. 2017). Journalistic fact-checking may be generally more effective in
countries with less polarized attitudes toward the media (Lyons et al. 2020).
Moreover, variation in party systems may affect the consequences to party elites
face for making fraudulent claims; when parties control ballot access, it may be eas-
ier to constrain problematic rhetoric in the first place (Carson and Williamson
2018). In addition, proportional representation (PR) systems may change the stra-
tegic calculus of using rhetoric that attacks election legitimacy because losing parties
still may have access to power through coalition bargaining (and voters in PR sys-
tems may be able to more easily punish norm violations by defecting to ideologically
similar parties). Finally, many countries have dramatically more fluid party attach-
ments than the USA; when party attachment is consistently weaker (Huddy,
Bankert and Davies 2018), fraud claims may simply carry less weight.
It is also important to consider the potential for expressive responding (Schaffner
and Luks 2018) (but see Berinsky 2018), which future work might rule out by solic-
iting higher stakes outcomes of interest (e.g., willingness to pay additional taxes to
improve election security). Future research could also test the effects of allegations
in a pre-election context and possibly examine effects on turnout or participation
intentions. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic highlights the importance of consid-
ering the effect of fraud allegations directed at mail voting and ballot counting,
which may be especially vulnerable to unfounded allegations.
Still, our study provides new insight into the effects of unsubstantiated claims of
voter fraud. We demonstrate that these allegations can undermine confidence in
elections, particularly when the claims are politically congenial, and may not be
effectively mitigated by fact-checking. In this way, the proliferation of unsubstanti-
ated claims of voter fraud threatens to undermine confidence in electoral integrity
and contribute to the erosion of US democracy.
Supplementary material. To view supplementary material for this article, please visit https://doi.org/10.
1017/XPS.2021.18
Data availability. The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this
article are available at the Journal of Experimental Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard
Dataverse Network, at: doi: 10.7910/DVN/530JGJ.
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